Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/170636
Authors: 
Gamba, Astrid
Immordino, Giovanni
Piccolo, Salvatore
Year of Publication: 
2016
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper, Dipartimento di Economia e Finanza (DISCE), Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore 39
Abstract: 
When Legislators introduce laws that award amnesties to 'low-rank' criminals co- operating with the justice, top criminals may bribe public officials to subvert the law. Legislators should anticipate this reaction and fight it back by introducing policies that bundle amnesties for low-rank criminals with amnesties to corrupt officials who plea guilty. In fact, the threat of being betrayed by their fellows may induce top-criminals to rely on corruption (to avoid sanctions). However, a suitable amnesty for corrupt officials may increase the conviction risk not only for top-criminal but also for low-rank ones. This domino effect can deter crime more than a policy based only on amnesties to low-rank criminals would: a bright side of subversion of law.
Subjects: 
Criminal Organizations
Corruption
Leniency
JEL: 
K14
K42
D73
D78
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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