Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/170602
Authors: 
Sobbrio, Francesco
Year of Publication: 
2013
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper, Dipartimento di Economia e Finanza (DISCE), Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore 5
Abstract: 
This paper provides a model of the market for news where profit-maximizing media outlets choose their editors from a population of rational citizens. The analysis identifies a novel mechanism of media bias: the bias in a media outlet's news reports is the result of the slanted endogenous information acquisition strategy of its editor. In particular, the results show that the expected accuracy of news reports is lower the more ideological an editor is. Nevertheless, citizens find it optimal to acquire information from a media outlet whose editor has similar ideological preferences. Depending on the distribution of citizens' ideological preferences, a media outlet may choose an ideological editor even in a monopolistic market. Moreover, ideological editors are more likely to be present in the market for news: i) the higher the number of media outlets competing in the market for news; ii) the lower the opportunity cost that citizens have to incur to acquire information
Subjects: 
Media Bias
Slant
Information Acquisition
Valence
Competition
JEL: 
D81
D82
L82
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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