Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/170556 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2017
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IAAEU Discussion Paper Series in Economics No. 10/2017
Verlag: 
University of Trier, Institute for Labour Law and Industrial Relations in the European Union (IAAEU), Trier
Zusammenfassung: 
Empirical evidence suggests that high-productivity firms face stronger trade unions than low-productivity firms. Then a policy that puts all unions into a better bargaining position is no longer neutral for firm selection as in models with a uniform bargaining strength across firms. Using a Melitztype model, we show that firm selection becomes less severe. Since more low-productivity firms enter the market, the negative employment effect of unionization is mitigated. Neglecting inter-union differences in bargaining power leads to an overestimation of the negative labor market effects. However, trade liberalization increases unemployment because firms with the least powerful labor unions have to leave the market.
Schlagwörter: 
Trade Unions
Bargaining Power
Firm Heterogeneity
International Trade
Unemployment
JEL: 
F1
F16
J5
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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