Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/169506
Authors: 
Wohlfarth, Michael
Year of Publication: 
2017
Series/Report no.: 
28th European Regional Conference of the International Telecommunications Society (ITS): "Competition and Regulation in the Information Age", Passau, Germany, July 30 - August 2, 2017
Abstract: 
Data portability allows users to transfer data from one online service to another service. As data gets increasingly valuable for online services and users alike, and as data portability will be politically enforced within the European Union by the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), we develop a game-theoretic model that incorporates the competitive effects arising from a right to data portability. We show, among others, that although data portability is designed to protect users, a right to data portability may hurt customers because new services increase the amount of collected data compared to the case without a right to data portability. However, profits for new services and total surplus unambiguously increase with a right to data portability, improving innovation and service variety. Consequently, policy makers should be aware that the decision to enforce data portability is far more complex than currently realized and should consider the case-specific effects.
Subjects: 
Data portability
Regulation of online services
Market entry and innovation
Consumer protection
Switching costs
GDPR
Document Type: 
Conference Paper

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