Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/169371 
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Title: 

Competition, collusion and spatial sales patterns: Theory and evidence

The document was removed on behalf of the author(s)/ the editor(s).

Year of Publication: 
2017
Series/Report no.: 
ZEW Discussion Papers No. 17-035
Publisher: 
Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW), Mannheim
Abstract: 
We study competition in markets with significant transport costs and capacity constraints. We compare the cases of price competition and coordination in a theoretical model and find that when firms compete, they more often serve more distant customers that are closer to plants of competitors. By means of a rich micro-level data set of the cement industry in Germany, we provide empirical evidence in support of this result. Controlling for other potentially confounding factors, such as the number of production plants and demand, we find that the transport distances between suppliers and customers were on average significantly lower in cartel years than in non-cartel years.
Subjects: 
capacity constraints
cartel
cement
transport costs
JEL: 
K21
L11
L41
L61
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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The document was removed on behalf of the author(s)/ the editor(s) on: January 9, 2018


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