Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/168159
Authors: 
Janssen, Maarten
Year of Publication: 
2017
Series/Report no.: 
Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2017: Alternative Geld- und Finanzarchitekturen - Session: Industrial Organisation Theory I No. B03-V3
Abstract: 
Firms can communicate private information about product quality through a combination of pricing and disclosure where disclosure may be deliberately false. We examine the effect of regulation that penalizes false disclosure by firms in a competitive setting. The cost of false disclosure influences the mix of direct, costly information provision and price signaling in the market, and thereby market outcomes. Regulation reduces prices and the consumption distortion associated with price signaling.
JEL: 
L13
L15
D82
D43
Document Type: 
Conference Paper

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