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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2016
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[Journal:] Games [ISSN:] 2073-4336 [Volume:] 7 [Issue:] 4 [Publisher:] MDPI [Place:] Basel [Year:] 2016 [Pages:] 1-17
Verlag: 
MDPI, Basel
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper develops a game-theoretic and epistemic account of a peculiar mode of practical reasoning that sustains focal points but also more general forms of rule-following behavior which I call community-based reasoning (CBR). It emphasizes the importance of counterfactuals in strategic interactions. In particular, the existence of rules does not reduce to observable behavioral patterns but also encompasses a range of counterfactual beliefs and behaviors. This feature was already at the core of Wittgenstein's philosophical account of rule-following. On this basis, I consider the possibility that CBR may provide a rational basis for cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma.
Schlagwörter: 
community-based reasoning
epistemic logic
game theory
rule-following
counterfactuals
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