Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/167993
Authors: 
Chen, Jing
Micali, Silvio
Year of Publication: 
2016
Citation: 
[Journal:] Games [ISSN:] 2073-4336 [Volume:] 7 [Year:] 2016 [Issue:] 4 [Pages:] 1-19
Abstract: 
In unrestricted combinatorial auctions, we put forward a mechanism that guarantees a meaningful revenue benchmark based on the possibilistic beliefs that the players have about each other's valuations. In essence, the mechanism guarantees, within a factor of two, the maximum revenue that the 'best informed player' would be sure to obtain if he/she were to sell the goods to his/her opponents via take-it-or-leave-it offers. Our mechanism is probabilistic and of an extensive form. It relies on a new solution concept, for analyzing extensive-form games of incomplete information, which assumes only mutual belief of rationality. Moreover, our mechanism enjoys several novel properties with respect to privacy, computation and collusion.
Subjects: 
possibilistic beliefs
unrestricted combinatorial auctions
mutual belief of rationality
incomplete information
extensive-form games
distinguishable dominance
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
Document Type: 
Article
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