Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/167925
Authors: 
Delille, Rémy
Pereau, Jean-Christophe
Year of Publication: 
2014
Citation: 
[Journal:] Games [ISSN:] 2073-4336 [Volume:] 5 [Year:] 2014 [Issue:] 2 [Pages:] 127-139
Abstract: 
Agents located from downstream to upstream along an estuary and exposed to a flooding risk have to invest in facilities like a seawall (or dike). As the benefits of that local public good increase along the estuary, upstream agents have to bargain for monetary compensation with the most downstream agent in exchange for more protection effort. The paper analyses different bargaining protocols and determines the conditions under which agents are better off. The results show that upstream agents are involved in a chicken game when they have to bargain with the most downstream agent.
Subjects: 
alternating-offer model
chicken game
public good
sea-flood
seawall
JEL: 
C78
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/
Document Type: 
Article
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