Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/162877 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2016
Quellenangabe: 
[Journal:] Economics Letters [ISSN:] 0165-1765 [Volume:] 141 [Publisher:] Elsevier [Place:] Amsterdam [Year:] 2016 [Year:] 2016 [Pages:] 119-121
Verlag: 
Elsevier, Amsterdam
Zusammenfassung: 
We compare dictator and impunity games. In impunity games, responders can reject offers but to no payoff consequence to proposers. Because proposers act under impunity, we should expect the same behavior across games, but experimentally observed behavior varies. Responders indeed exercise the rejection option. This threat psychologically influences proposers. Some proposers avoid rejection by offering nothing. Others raise offers, but only when they receive feedback from responders. Responders lose this influence in the absence of feedback.
Schlagwörter: 
Dictator
Psychological influence
Experiment
Impunity
Guilt
JEL: 
C78
C92
DOI der veröffentlichten Version: 
Sonstige Angaben: 
This is the preprint of an article published in Economics Letters 141 (2016), pp. 119-121 available online at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2016.02.020
Creative-Commons-Lizenz: 
cc-by-nc-nd Logo
Dokumentart: 
Article
Dokumentversion: 
Manuscript Version (Preprint)

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.