Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/162877
Authors: 
Kritikos, Alexander S.
Tan, Jonathan H.W.
Year of Publication: 
2016
Citation: 
[Journal:] Economics Letters [ISSN:] 0165-1765 [Publisher:] Elsevier [Place:] Amsterdam [Year:] 2016 [Volume:] 141 [Year:] 2016 [Pages:] 119-121
Abstract: 
We compare dictator and impunity games. In impunity games, responders can reject offers but to no payoff consequence to proposers. Because proposers act under impunity, we should expect the same behavior across games, but experimentally observed behavior varies. Responders indeed exercise the rejection option. This threat psychologically influences proposers. Some proposers avoid rejection by offering nothing. Others raise offers, but only when they receive feedback from responders. Responders lose this influence in the absence of feedback.
Subjects: 
Dictator
Psychological influence
Experiment
Impunity
Guilt
JEL: 
C78
C92
Published Version’s DOI: 
Additional Information: 
This is the preprint of an article published in Economics Letters 141 (2016), pp. 119-121 available online at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2016.02.020
Creative Commons License: 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
Document Type: 
Article
Document Version: 
Manuscript Version (Preprint)

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