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Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2017
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 10707
Verlag: 
Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), Bonn
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper estimates the effects of temporary driver's license suspensions on driving behavior. A little known rule in the German traffic penalty catalogue maintains that drivers who commit a series of speeding transgressions within 365 days should have their license suspended for one month. My regression discontinuity design exploits the quasi-random assignment of license suspensions caused by the 365-days cut-off and shows that 1-month license suspensions lower the probability of recidivating within a year by 20 percent. This is largely a specific deterrence effect driven by the punishment itself and not by incapacitation, information asymmetries, or the threat of stiffer future penalties.
Schlagwörter: 
crime
speeding
deterrence
regression discontinuity
JEL: 
I12
K42
R41
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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