Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/159765 
Year of Publication: 
2014
Series/Report no.: 
Quaderni - Working Paper DSE No. 926
Publisher: 
Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE), Bologna
Abstract: 
We investigate the optimal R&D portfolio of a single-product monopolist investing in cost-reducing activities accompanied by efforts improving the quality of its product. There emerges that the firm's relative incentives along the two directions are conditional upon market affluency, measured by consumers' willingness to pay for quality, and R&D efforts are complements at equilibrium. We also perform the stability analysis, showing that a stable branch exists along the quality dimension only.
JEL: 
L12
O31
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by-nc Logo
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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