Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/159709 
Year of Publication: 
2013
Series/Report no.: 
Quaderni - Working Paper DSE No. 870
Publisher: 
Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE), Bologna
Abstract: 
In this paper we show that, in the presence of buyer and seller power, a monopolist can enter into a costly contractual relationship with a low-quality supplier with the sole intention of improving its bargaining position relative to a high-quality supplier, without ever selling the good produced by that firm.
JEL: 
L12
L13
L14
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by-nc Logo
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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