Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/159093 
Year of Publication: 
1996
Series/Report no.: 
Quaderni - Working Paper DSE No. 250
Publisher: 
Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE), Bologna
Abstract: 
This paper reformulates the issue of the international coordination of monetary policy in the framework of an extended game with observable delay, where governments are required to set the timing of their respective actions before proceeding to the actual choice of their monetary policies. This allows to shrink signi…cantly the set of equilibria.
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by-nc Logo
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
145.82 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.