Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/158603
Authors: 
Goerke, Laszlo
Year of Publication: 
2005
Citation: 
[Journal:] Zeitschrift für ArbeitsmarktForschung – Journal for Labour Market Research [ISSN:] 2510-5027 [Volume:] 38 [Year:] 2005 [Issue:] 2/3 [Pages:] 230-240
Abstract (Translated): 
This paper examines the effects of industrial action and the impact of strike costs on the industrial action activity. Germany is characterised by having little industrial action. Within the framework of a wage bargaining model, it is argued that higher industrial action costs for the union lead to lower wages and more employment. However, international competition weakens this correlation. Finally, in the context of a strike model based on asymmetrical information, the paper shows that one-sided changes in the costs of industrial action do not have any clear effects on the extent of the industrial action. In the author's view the impact of a change in the legislation regarding industrial action on Germany's labour market situation is therefore to be assessed as small.
Subjects: 
Arbeitskampf
Streikrecht
Aussperrung
Tarifpolitik
Kosten
Streik
Arbeitsausfall
Lohnfindung
Lohnsenkung
internationaler Wettbewerb
Beschäftigungseffekte
Document Type: 
Article

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