Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/158512
Authors: 
Buccella, Domenico
Year of Publication: 
2013
Citation: 
[Journal:] SERIEs - Journal of the Spanish Economic Association [ISSN:] 1869-4195 [Volume:] 4 [Year:] 2013 [Issue:] 4 [Pages:] 373-392
Abstract: 
This paper investigates the patterns of bargaining in multinational enterprises (MNEs) in the presence of labor unions coordination activities. It derives the bargaining regimes which arise as sub-game perfect equilibria, and considers both simultaneous and sequential games where parties choose whether to coordinate wage negotiations across subsidiaries. It shows that unions' per member transaction costs may attenuate the conflict of interests between bargaining parties as regards the centralization level at which negotiations should take place.
Subjects: 
Bargaining
Multinational enterprises
Labor unions
JEL: 
C78
F23
J51
D60
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0/
Document Type: 
Article

Files in This Item:
File
Size
337.31 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.