Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/156369
Authors: 
Maier, Ulf
Year of Publication: 
2016
Series/Report no.: 
Munich Discussion Paper 2016-10
Abstract: 
The lack of coordination in the resolution of multinational banks has led to demands for the increased centralization of resolution regimes. However, as this paper argues, the anticipation of resolution procedures affects the incentives of host countries to impose capital standards on their resident banks. Critically, it is shown that overall welfare can even be decreased by introducing a centralized resolution regime without fully centralizing capital requirements. As, in the aftermath of the financial crisis, only countries that are not part of a supranational resolution regime unilaterally and significantly increased the capital requirements for their largest resident banks, this paper can help to understand and study the heterogeneity of the observed regulatory approaches.
Subjects: 
regulatory competition
multinational banks
capital requirements
bank supervision
JEL: 
G21
G18
G33
F36
H73
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
497.03 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.