Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/156223
Authors: 
Kemnitz, Alexander
Roessler, Martin
Year of Publication: 
2017
Series/Report no.: 
CEPIE Working Paper 04/17
Abstract: 
This paper analyzes the utilization of repression and democratic institutions by a non-democratic government striving for political power and private rents. We find that economic development has different impacts on policy choices, depending on whether it appears in the form of rises in income or in education: A higher income level reduces democracy, whereas more education leads to both more democracy and more repression. These theoretical findings are corroborated by panel data regressions.
Subjects: 
Modernization Theory
Democracy
Repression
Non-democratic Government
JEL: 
C33
D72
K38
H11
O10
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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