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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2016
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working Papers in Economics and Statistics No. 2016-29
Verlag: 
University of Innsbruck, Research Platform Empirical and Experimental Economics (eeecon), Innsbruck
Zusammenfassung: 
Contests are meant to attract the best performers and incentivize high effort, however, they may also attract cheaters who try to win via illicit means which crowds out the best performers. We use a laboratory experiment to explore the role of self-selection in contests with a possibility of lying in a real effort task. Contrary to common wisdom, we do not find evidence that contests disproportionately attract intrinsic cheaters. However, we find that contests fail at selecting the best performers, as no difference is observed in the actual or perceived ability of those who selected into the contest versus those who selected into a comparable noncompetitive pay scheme.
Schlagwörter: 
contest
cheating
entry
experiment
JEL: 
D02
K42
M52
C90
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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