Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/155174
Authors: 
Currarini, Sergio
Marini, Marco
Year of Publication: 
2001
Series/Report no.: 
Nota di Lavoro 11.2001
Abstract: 
This paper proposes a formulation of coalitional payoff possibilities in games with externalities, based on the assumption that forming coalitions can exploit a "first mover advantage". We derive a characteristic function and show that when outside players play their best response noncooperatively, the core is always nonempty when the game has strategic complementarities. We apply this result to cartel formation in Bertrand oligopoly and in Shapley-Shubik (1977) strategic market games.
Subjects: 
Core
cooperative games
externalities
JEL: 
C7
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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