Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/155163
Authors: 
Lehmann, Markus A.
Year of Publication: 
2000
Series/Report no.: 
Nota di Lavoro, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei 110. 2000
Abstract: 
The paper reconsiders the Porter hypothesis in an offer/counter-offer bargaining model, in which a welfare-maximising regulator and an industry representative negotiate over which regulatory instrument to apply with which stringency. The possibility to contest planned regulation in the political arena is given as an outside option of the bargaining model. Policy instruments differ in their impacts on firms' profits and market shares, which yields different incentives for technology adoption. Furthermore, means of direct regulation may lead to an implicit cartelisation of the industry. This latter feature shapes the actors' equilibrium threat position, which, in turn, influences incentives to contest the regulation and the subsequent regulatory outcome. Depending on the parties' respective position in the political contest, the implementation of voluntary agreements or of other (negotiated or mandatory) policy instruments, as well as their impact on the technology adoption incentives, is endogenously derived within this single model.
Subjects: 
Voluntary agreements
technology adoption
Porter Hypothesis
JEL: 
D78
C78
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.