Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/154908
Authors: 
Yi, Sang-seung
Year of Publication: 
1998
Series/Report no.: 
Nota di Lavoro, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei 50.1998
Abstract: 
This paper studies stable structures of efficiency-enhancing joint ventures among symmetric firms. Efficiency gains that accrue to a joint venture are assumed to increase with its size. The socially efficient industry-wide joint venture is the stable outcome when membership of a joint venture is open to outside firms, but typically not when membership can be restricted. Members of a large joint venture want to restrict membership for strategic reasons - e.g., in order to keep rival firms' costs high. Side payments among firms do not eliminate the strategic incentives of members of a large joint venture to limit membership.
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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