Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/154880
Authors: 
Carraro, Carlo
Moriconi, Francesca
Year of Publication: 
1998
Series/Report no.: 
Nota di Lavoro, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei 22.1998
Abstract: 
In this paper an n-player non-co-operative game is used to model countries' decision of whether or not to sign an international agreement on climate change control. The stable coalition structure of the game is defined and then computed for a climate game in which the role of carbon leakage is also taken into account. At the equilibrium, a coalition may emerge despite the public good nature of climate. The size of the coalition depends on the degree of interdependence of countries' emission strategies, and on the type of conjectures that each country forms on the consequences of its own decision to join or to defect from the environmental coalition.
Subjects: 
Climate change
Non co-operative game theory
Endogenous formation of coalition
Rational conjectures
International agreements
JEL: 
C72
H41
Q40
Q48
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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