Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/154866
Authors: 
Ulph, Alistair M.
Year of Publication: 
1998
Series/Report no.: 
Nota di Lavoro, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei 8.1998
Abstract: 
Policy debates on trade and the environment frequently refer to a need for countries linked by trade to co-ordinate, or even harmonise, their purely domestic environmental policies. Underlying this argument is a concern that national governments will not fully internalise environmental externalities. Conventional trade models suggest this concern is unwarranted and harmonisation may be damaging. In this paper I consider two possible bases for this concern - strategic trade and political economy considerations - and assess the implications for the design of policy and political institutions to achieve co-ordination. A model which links these two factors suggests a possible rationale for harmonisation of environmental policies, even when countries differ significantly with respect to environmental damage costs.
Subjects: 
Environmental policy
International trade
Harmonisation
Asymmetric information
Political economy
Special interests
Restricting government discretion
JEL: 
F1
H7
Q2
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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