Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/154858
Authors: 
Carraro, Carlo
Siniscalco, Domenico
Year of Publication: 
1997
Series/Report no.: 
Nota di Lavoro 96.1997
Abstract: 
International environmental agreements are increasingly important in a globalised economy. Beyond their specific interest, these agreements are also important in the context of coalition formation theory. Given the incentives to free ride, associated to the environment as a public good and to the presence of spillovers, the profitability and the optimality of environmental agreements are separated from their stability (i.e. self-enforcement): hence, a whole set of political economy issues. This paper reviews the recent advances in this area. In particular it discusses mechanisms and strategies aimed at offsetting the incentives to free ride and increasing welfare, such as transfers, issue linkages, threats and multiple agreements. The main results show that partial coalitions and multiple agreements tend to prevail among subsets of players, and that agreements among all players are most unlikely to exist. The design of the agreements, moreover, can be crucial in determining the number of signatory countries.
Subjects: 
Coalitions
International Agreements
Environment
Political Economy
Games
JEL: 
J50
D60
H23
J21
Q43
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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