Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/154796 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
1997
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Nota di Lavoro No. 32.1997
Verlag: 
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM), Milano
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper develops a framework for the analysis of gatekeeping in tax enforcement, whereby independent auditors are assigned the duty of certifying taxpayers' reports. The equilibrium of the market for gatekeepers' services is characterised, as well as taxpayers' and auditors' optimal behaviour. The paper discusses the optimal structure of the gatekeeping regime and determines the conditions under which it is socially preferable to direct public enforcement.
Schlagwörter: 
Law enforcement
Tax evasion
Auditing
Collateral liability
Certification
JEL: 
K42
H26
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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