Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/154796
Authors: 
Franzoni, Luigi Alberto
Year of Publication: 
1997
Series/Report no.: 
Nota di Lavoro, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei 32.1997
Abstract: 
This paper develops a framework for the analysis of gatekeeping in tax enforcement, whereby independent auditors are assigned the duty of certifying taxpayers' reports. The equilibrium of the market for gatekeepers' services is characterised, as well as taxpayers' and auditors' optimal behaviour. The paper discusses the optimal structure of the gatekeeping regime and determines the conditions under which it is socially preferable to direct public enforcement.
Subjects: 
Law enforcement
Tax evasion
Auditing
Collateral liability
Certification
JEL: 
K42
H26
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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