Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/154716
Authors: 
Bütler, Monika
Deuchert, Eva
Lechner, Michael
Staubli, Stefan
Thiemann, Petra
Year of Publication: 
2015
Citation: 
[Journal:] IZA Journal of Labor Policy [ISSN:] 2193-9004 [Volume:] 4 [Year:] 2015 [Pages:] 1-18
Abstract: 
Disability insurance (DI) beneficiaries lose part or all of their benefits if earnings exceed certain thresholds ("cash-cliffs"). This implicit taxation is considered the prime reason for the low number of beneficiaries who expand work and reduce benefit receipt. We analyse a conditional cash programme that incentivises work related reductions of disability benefits in Switzerland. Four thousand DI beneficiaries received an offer to claim up to CHF 72,000 (USD 77,000) if they expand work and reduce benefits. Initial reactions to the programme announcement, measured by call-back rates, are modest. By the end of the field phase, the take-up rate is only 0.5 %.
Subjects: 
Disability insurance
Field experiment
Financial incentive
Return-to-work
JEL: 
H55
J14
C93
D04
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
Document Type: 
Article

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