Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/154580
Authors: 
Salines, Marion
Glöckler, Gabriel
Truchlewski, Zbigniew
del Favero, Paola
Year of Publication: 
2011
Series/Report no.: 
ECB Occasional Paper 127
Abstract: 
This Occasional Paper examines how and why the institutional framework governing EMU has evolved since the creation of the euro. Building on theories of institutionalism, the paper in particular investigates to what extent functional spillovers from the single currency into other policy domains, like macroeconomic policies or financial regulation, met with an adequate institutional response, and to what extent the existing institutional framework conditioned the response to the financial crisis. The interaction between policy requirements and institutional capabilities is examined both in “ordinary times” (1999-2007) and under “crisis conditions” (2007-10). The paper uses a typology of change which helps to put into perspective both the resilience of the institutional framework of EMU and its capacity to adapt. In this respect, it allows for a better understanding and framing of the current reforms of EMU economic governance. It concludes that even though the crisis will accelerate institutional development, it will do so only gradually, as path dependence and an inbuilt bias towards incremental change will prevent policy-makers from pursuing a “clean slate” strategy.
Subjects: 
EMU institutional architecture
historical institutionalism
institutional change.
rational choice
JEL: 
E52
E31
D84
Document Type: 
Research Report

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