Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/152369 
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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2016
Quellenangabe: 
[Journal:] IZA Journal of Labor Economics [ISSN:] 2193-8997 [Volume:] 5 [Issue:] 5 [Publisher:] Springer [Place:] Heidelberg [Year:] 2016 [Pages:] 1-29
Verlag: 
Springer, Heidelberg
Zusammenfassung: 
This article appeals to heterogeneity in workers' non-wage preferences to model taste-based discrimination. Firms hire both types of workers and pay lower wages to minority workers, whatever their taste for discrimination. A single prejudiced firm in the market produces a substantial wage gap in all firms. Consequently, discrimination allows unprejudiced firms to make non-zero profits, so that they have little incentive to drive out prejudiced firms. As the market does not eliminate discrimination, state intervention is required. Indirect policies do not affect the absolute wage gap between the two groups, but may be more likely to be used than direct policies.
Schlagwörter: 
Discrimination
Oligopsony
Wage gap
JEL: 
J42
J71
L13
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