Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/150414
Authors: 
Echenique, Federico
Wilson, Alistair J.
Yariv, Leeat
Year of Publication: 
2016
Citation: 
[Journal:] Quantitative Economics [ISSN:] 1759-7331 [Volume:] 7 [Year:] 2016 [Issue:] 2 [Pages:] 449-482
Abstract: 
We experimentally study the Gale and Shapley, 1962 mechanism, which is utilized in a wide set of applications, most prominently the National Resident Matching Program (NRMP). Several insights come out of our analysis. First, only 48% of our observed outcomes are stable, and among those a large majority culminate at the receiver-optimal stable matching. Second, receivers rarely truncate their true preferences: it is the proposers who do not make offers in order of their preference, frequently skipping potential partners. Third, market characteristics affect behavior: both the cardinal representation and core size influence whether laboratory outcomes are stable. We conclude by using our controlled results and a behavioral model to shed light on a number of stylized facts we derive from new NRMP survey and outcome data, and to explain the small cores previously documented for the NRMP.
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/
Document Type: 
Article

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