Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/150400 
Authors: 
Year of Publication: 
2015
Citation: 
[Journal:] Quantitative Economics [ISSN:] 1759-7331 [Volume:] 6 [Issue:] 3 [Publisher:] The Econometric Society [Place:] New Haven, CT [Year:] 2015 [Pages:] 795-823
Publisher: 
The Econometric Society, New Haven, CT
Abstract: 
More debt forgiveness directly benefits households but indirectly makes credit more expensive. How does aggregate risk affect this trade-off? In a calibrated general equilibrium life-cycle model, aggregate risk reduces the welfare benefit of making default very costly when the costs are borne by all households at all times. The result does not necessarily extend to state-contingent policies. The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 in particular generates a small welfare loss with or without aggregate risk.
Subjects: 
Bankruptcy
law
consumer finance
business cycles
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by-nc Logo
Document Type: 
Article

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.