Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/150296 
Authors: 
Year of Publication: 
2016
Citation: 
[Journal:] Theoretical Economics [ISSN:] 1555-7561 [Volume:] 11 [Issue:] 3 [Publisher:] The Econometric Society [Place:] New Haven, CT [Year:] 2016 [Pages:] 865-895
Publisher: 
The Econometric Society, New Haven, CT
Abstract: 
The Condorcet Jury Theorem states that given subjective expected utility maximization and common values, the equilibrium probability that the correct candidate wins goes to one as the size of the electorate goes to infinity. This paper studies strategic voting when voters have pure common values but may be ambiguity averse -- exhibit Ellsberg-type behavior -- as modeled by maxmin expected utility preferences. It provides sufficient conditions so that the equilibrium probability of the correct candidate winning the election is bounded above by one half in at least one state. As a consequence, there is no equilibrium in which information aggregates.
Subjects: 
Ambiguity
voting
elections
information aggregation
JEL: 
D72
D81
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by-nc Logo
Document Type: 
Article

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