Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/150166 
Year of Publication: 
2012
Citation: 
[Journal:] Theoretical Economics [ISSN:] 1555-7561 [Volume:] 7 [Issue:] 1 [Publisher:] The Econometric Society [Place:] New Haven, CT [Year:] 2012 [Pages:] 99-124
Publisher: 
The Econometric Society, New Haven, CT
Abstract: 
We study a decision maker (DM) who has preferences over choice problems, which are sets of payoff-allocations between herself and a passive recipient. An example of such a set is the collection of possible allocations in the classic dictator game. The choice of an allocation from the set is observed by the recipient, whereas the choice of the set itself is not. Behaving selfishly under observation, in the sense of not choosing the normatively best allocation, inflicts shame on DM. We derive a representation that identifies DM's private ranking of allocations, her subjective norm, and shame. The normatively best allocation can be further characterized as the Nash solution of a bargaining game induced by the second-stage choice problem.
Subjects: 
Shame
selfishness
subjective norm
dictator game
Nash bargaining solution
JEL: 
C78
D63
D64
D80
D81
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by-nc Logo
Document Type: 
Article

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