Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/149588
Authors: 
Hoffmann, Timo
Renes, Sander
Year of Publication: 
2016
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper Series, Department of Economics, University of Mannheim 16-11
Abstract: 
Before a group can take a decision, its members must agree on a mechanism to aggregate individual preferences. In this paper we present the results of an experiment on the influence of private payoff information and the role of the available alternatives on individuals' mechanism choices in such group choice situations. While efficient mechanisms are desirable, we experimentally show that participation constraints can prevent their implementation. We find strong indications that individual preferences for choice rules are sensitive to individual expected payoffs. Our results highlight the importance of considering participation constraints when designing choice institutions.
Subjects: 
Experimental economics
Group choice
Choice rules
Mechanisms
Participation constraints
Two-stage voting
Bayesian games
JEL: 
C91
C92
D70
D82
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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