Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/148520 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2016
Quellenangabe: 
[Journal:] IZA World of Labor [ISSN:] 2054-9571 [Article No.:] 295 [Publisher:] Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) [Place:] Bonn [Year:] 2016
Verlag: 
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), Bonn
Zusammenfassung: 
Standardized testing has become the accepted means of measuring a school’s quality. However, the associated rise in test-based accountability creates incentives for schools, teachers, and students to manipulate test scores. Illicit behavior may also occur in institutional settings where performance standards are weak. These issues are important because inaccurate measurement of student achievement leads to poor or ineffective policy conclusions. The consequences of mismeasured student achievement for policy conclusions have been documented in many institutional contexts in Europe and North America, and guidelines can be devised for the future.
Schlagwörter: 
cheating
score manipulation
standardized testing
JEL: 
N3
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
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