Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/147983
Authors: 
Puppe, Clemens
Year of Publication: 
2016
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper Series in Economics, Karlsruher Institut für Technologie (KIT) 97
Abstract: 
It is proved that, among all restricted preference domains that guarantee consistency (i.e. transitivity) of pairwise majority voting, the single-peaked domain is the only minimally rich and connected domain that contains two completely reversed strict preference orders. It is argued that this result explains the predominant role of single-peakedness as a domain restriction in models of political economy and elsewhere. The main result has a number of corollaries, among them a dual characterization of the single-dipped do- main; it also implies that a single-crossing ('order-restricted') domain can be minimally rich only if it is a subdomain of a single-peaked domain. The conclusions are robust as the results apply both to domains of strict and of weak preference orders, respectively.
Subjects: 
social choice
restricted domains
Condorcet domains
single-peakedness
single-dippedness
majority voting
single-crossing property
JEL: 
D71
C72
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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