Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/147431 
Year of Publication: 
2015
Series/Report no.: 
Memorandum No. 13/2015
Publisher: 
University of Oslo, Department of Economics, Oslo
Abstract: 
We study the effect of salience in the social security benefit system on labor earnings by exploiting kinks and notches in budget lines introduced by earnings testing and social security accrual mechanisms for 67-69 year old workers in Norway. An earnings test had large effects on labor earnings, while an accrual system discontinuity had no discernible effects. We interpret the difference as likely to be caused by a lack of salience in the accrual incentives: agents are not able or willing to take into account the value of future benefit increases when considering the relevant rewards to working.
Subjects: 
labor supply
retirement earnings test
social security wealth
difference-in-differences
JEL: 
J14
H55
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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