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Bonanno, Giacomo
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Working Papers, University of California, Department of Economics 14-9
We discuss the issues that arise in modeling the notion of common belief of rationality in epistemic models of dynamic games, in particular at the level of interpretation of strategies. A strategy in a dynamic game is defined as a function that associates with every information set a choice at that information set. Implicit in this definition is a set of counterfactual statements concerning what a player would do at information sets that are not reached, or a belief revision policy concerning behavior at information sets that are ruled out by the initial beliefs. We discuss the role of both objective and subjective counterfactuals in attempting to flesh out the interpretation of strategies in epistemic models of dynamic games.
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Working Paper

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