Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/145647
Authors: 
Nöldeke, Georg
Peña, Jorge
Year of Publication: 
2016
Series/Report no.: 
Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2016: Demographischer Wandel - Session: Political Processes: Theory and Evidence G22-V2
Abstract: 
We characterize the symmetric Nash equilibria of the symmetric voter participation game with complete information introduced by Palfrey and Rosenthal (1983). Our results confirm their conjecture on the existence, multiplicity, and comparative statics of such equilibria and yield more precise information on how changes in team size affect the location of equilibria.
JEL: 
D72
C72
C02
Document Type: 
Conference Paper

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