Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/145498
Authors: 
De Pinto, Marco
Goerke, Laszlo
Year of Publication: 
2016
Series/Report no.: 
Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2016: Demographischer Wandel - Session: Market Structure and Firm Strategy in Oligopoly D03-V3
Abstract: 
If input markets are competitive and output per firm declines with the number of firms (business stealing effect), there will be excessive entry into a Cournot oligopoly for a homogeneous commodity. However, input markets are often imperfectly competitive and the price of labor is determined by collective bargaining. The resulting rise in wages reduces output and profits and can deter entry. We analyze under which conditions greater bargaining power by the trade union reduces entry and raises welfare. Furthermore, we show that collective bargaining loosens the linkage between business stealing and excessive entry.
JEL: 
D43
J51
L13
Document Type: 
Conference Paper

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