Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/145174 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2016
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 10040
Verlag: 
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), Bonn
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper models child employment and parental pocket money decisions as a non-cooperative game. Assuming that the child human capital is a household public good and that the relationship between child human capital and employment is concave, we compare the welfare obtained under different decision-making mechanisms and test the predictions of the model for a cohort of English teenagers in compulsory education. Our results support a situation in which parents 'tax' their children's earnings, withdrawing financial support as the child increases his working hours. This strategy forces the child to internalise the social cost of his activities.
Schlagwörter: 
intra-household transfers
pocket money
child labour supply
noncooperative game
human capital
JEL: 
C52
C72
D13
J22
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
808.48 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.