Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/144851
Authors: 
Frick, Andreas
Maxin, Hannes
Year of Publication: 
2016
Series/Report no.: 
Hannover Economic Papers (HEP) 577
Abstract: 
Venture capital and corporate venture capital firms are driven by high financial returns through the sale of ownership stakes. Additionally, corporate venture capital firms maximize the profits of their parent companies by generating innovation advantage. Despite this, both intermediaries can join syndicates to obtain more information about their potential investments. We examine a model to show the differences between the syndication decisions of these two investor types. We find that corporate venture capital firms finance more projects without a syndicate in comparison with venture capital firms. To reinforce our theoretical results, we conduct a survey about the German private equity market. The empirical evidence support our main theoretical findings.
Subjects: 
Corporate venture capital
Venture capital
Syndication
Screening
JEL: 
G24
M13
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
505.09 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.