Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/144685
Authors: 
Verbeck, Matthias
Schulte, Elisabeth
Year of Publication: 
2016
Series/Report no.: 
Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics 20-2016
Abstract: 
We study a setting in which one or two agents conduct research on behalf of a principal. The agents' success depends on effort and the choice of a research technology that is uncertain with respect to its quality. A single agent has no incentive to deviate from the principal's preferred technology choice. In the multiagent-setting researchers pursue individual rather than overall success which yields a preference for the most promising technology. We show that a mechanism that deters this bias towards mainstream research always entails an efficiency loss if researchers are risk-averse. Our results suggest that there is too little diversity in delegated research.
Subjects: 
Moral hazard
Hidden action
Incentives in teams
Delegated research
Academic organization
Diversity in research
JEL: 
D82
D83
D86
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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