Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/144685 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2016
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
MAGKS Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics No. 20-2016
Verlag: 
Philipps-University Marburg, School of Business and Economics, Marburg
Zusammenfassung: 
We study a setting in which one or two agents conduct research on behalf of a principal. The agents' success depends on effort and the choice of a research technology that is uncertain with respect to its quality. A single agent has no incentive to deviate from the principal's preferred technology choice. In the multiagent-setting researchers pursue individual rather than overall success which yields a preference for the most promising technology. We show that a mechanism that deters this bias towards mainstream research always entails an efficiency loss if researchers are risk-averse. Our results suggest that there is too little diversity in delegated research.
Schlagwörter: 
Moral hazard
Hidden action
Incentives in teams
Delegated research
Academic organization
Diversity in research
JEL: 
D82
D83
D86
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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