Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/144276
Authors: 
de Walque, Grégory
Year of Publication: 
2004
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper Research 62
Abstract: 
The paper presents a non-exhaustive survey of the literature designed to explain emergence, size and political sustainability of pay-as-you-go pension systems. It proposes a simple framework of analysis (a small open two overlapping generation economy model), around which some variants are displayed. Dictatorship of the median voter is assumed. The text is organized to answer the following questions: (i) do political equilibria with PAYG pension schemes exist, (ii) why do they emerge, (iii) what are the conditions for the participation constraint of the pension game to be verified, and finally (iv) what is the size of the pension system chosen by the median voter and how is this size influenced by an exogenous (e.g. demographic) shock.
Subjects: 
public pensions
voting.
JEL: 
D72
D91
H55
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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