Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/142407 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2016
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 9968
Verlag: 
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), Bonn
Zusammenfassung: 
The electorates' lack of information about the extent of public spending may cause misalignments between voters' preferences and the size of government. We devise a series of representative survey experiments in Germany that randomly provide treatment groups with information on current spending levels. Results show that such information strongly reduces support for public spending in various domains from social security to defense. Data on prior information status on school spending and teacher salaries shows that treatment effects are strongest for those who initially underestimated spending levels, indicating genuine information effects rather than pure priming effects. Information on spending requirements also reduces support for specific education reforms. Preferences on spending across education levels are also malleable to information.
Schlagwörter: 
public spending
information
preferences
education spending
survey experiment
JEL: 
H11
D83
D72
H52
I22
P16
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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