Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/142013 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2015
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CSIO Working Paper No. 0139
Verlag: 
Northwestern University, Center for the Study of Industrial Organization (CSIO), Evanston, IL
Zusammenfassung: 
We examine an infi nitely repeated game between a principal, who has the formal authority to decide on a project, and a biased agent, who is privately informed about what projects are available. The optimal relational contract speaks to how power is earned, lost, and retained. It shows that entrenched power structures are consistent with optimal administration of power. And it provides new perspectives on why similar firms organize differently, even when those organizational differences lead to persistent differences in performance, and why established firms fail to exploit new opportunities, even when they are publicly observable.
Schlagwörter: 
internal organization
relational contracting
power
JEL: 
D23
D82
L23
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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