Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/140630
Authors: 
Güth, Werner
Pull, Kerstin
Stadler, Manfred
Zaby, Alexandra
Year of Publication: 
2016
Series/Report no.: 
University of Tübingen Working Papers in Economics and Finance 90
Abstract: 
This paper analyzes blindfolded versus informed ultimatum bargaining where proposer and responder are both either uninformed or informed about the size of the pie. Analyzing the transition from one information setting to the other suggests that more information induces lower (higher) price offers and acceptance thresholds when the pie is small (large). While our experimental data confirm this transition effect, risk aversion leads to diverging results in blindfolded ultimatum bargaining due to task-independent strategies such as 'equal sharing' or the 'golden mean.' The probability of successful bargaining is lower in case of blindfolded than informed ultimatum bargaining.
Subjects: 
ultimatum bargaining
information structure
experimental economics
JEL: 
C91
D82
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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